Open Access Journal Article

Bayesian-Nash equilibria for fuzzy value auctions

by Alexey S. Shvedov a,* orcid
a
Department of Applied Economics, National Research University Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya ulitsa, Moscow, 101000, Russia
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
EAL  2024 3(2):59; https://doi.org/10.58567/eal03020008
Received: 30 October 2023 / Accepted: 11 March 2024 / Published Online: 13 March 2024
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Abstract

This paper analyses a model of private value auctions with symmetric risk-neutral bidders, where bidders' private values of an indivisible good are fuzzy. The auction is studied as a game with incomplete information. Fuzzy random variables, their quantile functions, and expressions for expectations through quantile functions are used. An explicit expression for the solution is found. Also, expected bidders' payments are studied.

Keywords: Auction theory; Equilibrium strategy; Bidder's payment; Fuzzy random variable; Quantile function;
Copyright: © 2024 by Shvedov. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) (Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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ACS Style
Shvedov, A. S. Bayesian-Nash equilibria for fuzzy value auctions. Economic Analysis Letters, 2024, 3, 59. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal03020008
AMA Style
Shvedov A S. Bayesian-Nash equilibria for fuzzy value auctions. Economic Analysis Letters; 2024, 3(2):59. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal03020008
Chicago/Turabian Style
Shvedov, Alexey S. 2024. "Bayesian-Nash equilibria for fuzzy value auctions" Economic Analysis Letters 3, no.2:59. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal03020008
APA style
Shvedov, A. S. (2024). Bayesian-Nash equilibria for fuzzy value auctions. Economic Analysis Letters, 3(2), 59. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal03020008

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