Deposit insurance systems are designed to balance the benefits of preventing bank runs and protecting ordinary savers against the costs of reduced market discipline and potential burdens on taxpayers. Design flaws of deposit insurance make the benefits too low and the costs too high. This paper presents an example in which solvent banks can effectively manage runs, depositors discipline banks to a reasonable extent, and taxpayers have a fair deal. It has three key features: the bank’s authority to activate deposit insurance early, a coinsurance scheme that transfer money from those who run on solvent banks to those who stay put, and a shareholder position for taxpayers. Early activation of deposit insurance prevents fire sales of assets and provides opportunities to verify the bank’s solvency. The coinsurance scheme weakens the incentive to run and strengthens the incentive to hold on to their accounts. As shareholders, taxpayers receive dividends in normal times in exchange for large payouts in catastrophic events.

The objectives and tasks of the European Central Bank (ECB) are defined in Articles 2 and 3 of Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the European Central Bank (ECB). While in Article 3,1° of this Protocol other tasks are mentioned, the prime objective of the ESCB and therefore of the ECB, is price stability. This concept was originally specified by the Executive Board of the ECB as an annual increase of less than 2% in the inflation rate over the medium term, measured by the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area. This paper examines to what extent the ECB has been effective in realizing price stability over the period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2022. Price stability is important for economic agents. It allows them to plan their savings, spending and investment eventually resulting in sustained economic growth.   Notwithstanding the commitment of large human and other resources and the use of unconventional monetary policies, the ECB did not realize its prime objective during a large part of this period. We conclude that putting too much confidence in DSGE-modeling as one of the methodologies to determine monetary policy, may have played an important role in the ECB not achieving its main statutory objective.

This paper examines the link between informality and corruption, two interlinked phenomena that have negative impacts on economic development. The paper presents a neoclassical model simulation that illustrates how informality can drive corruption in the economy, emphasizing the incentives for corruption in an economy with informal and formal sectors. The model provides insights into the mechanisms that promote corruption and how policymakers can reduce it through formalisation. The paper reviews the existing literature on informality and corruption, highlighting the empirical evidence and theoretical models that support the relationship between the two. The research finds that countries with larger informal sectors tend to have higher levels of corruption. The study contributes to the ongoing debate on how to reduce corruption and promote formalisation, which are crucial for sustainable economic growth.

Calculating the amount of regulatory capital to cover unexpected losses due to operational events in the upcoming year has caused problems because of difficulties in fitting probability distributions to data. It is consequently difficult to judge an appropriate level of capital that reflects the risk profile of a financial institution. We provide theoretical and empirical analyses to link the calculated capital to the sum of losses using appropriate statistical approximations. We conclude that, in order to reasonably reflect the associated risk, the capital should be approximately half the sum of losses, with a wide bound for the ratio of capital to sum.

Spence’s signaling model (Spence, 1973) suggests that education can signal workers’ unobserved ability to employers thereby mitigating discrimination. There have been several studies concerning education’s impact on labor market discrimination against minority or disadvantaged groups. Our approach in this inquiry is unique in that we utilize the data of PhD recipients, a group of people with the highest education attainment, to test Spence’s theory. Another novelty of this paper is that in addition to examining possible discrimination against women and foreign-born, as has been done in previous studies, we further explore possible discrimination against the physically challenged individuals. Our baseline results show conflicting results that Ph.D. education can reduce discrimination against disability and foreign-born but not against gender. Further analysis by the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition shows that the wage gaps of gender and disability come more from the unobserved part than the explained part, while the foreign-born wage gap come more from the observable human capital differences. Since prejudice is an unobserved factor and we know that the disadvantaged groups are likely to suffer from prejudice (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; Montes-Rojas et al., 2017; Deshpande and Khanna, 2018), we conjecture that prejudice might be attributable to the unexplained part of the wage gaps. Furthermore, prejudice might be deeply rooted in one’s mind, thus difficult to remove even with the influence of education. Hence, our results reveal that it would be hard for Ph.D. education to eradicate the discrimination against gender and disability, but not against foreign-born.

Bank deposit is closely related to systemic risks. In addition, considering that resident deposits in China have significant seasonal characteristics, this paper focuses on which component of deposits drives the systemic risk volatility, that is, it can supplement the existing forecast information. We use X-13ARIMA-SEATS to decompose deposit into three subsequences. The research findings show that the forecast effect of subsequence models is better than that of benchmark series. Most importantly, the model with trend component has the best forecast performance.

We assess the impact of the Strategic Economic Plan on Singapore’s long-term GDP per capita. To our knowledge, we are the first to evaluate the effect of the 1991 plan on Singapore’s successful growth trajectory using methodologies aimed at causal identification. In other words, this article applies the Synthetic Control method and World Bank data from 1970 to 2018. We estimate an average increase of 6,641.71 US$ in Singapore’s GDP per capita. Results remain robust to placebo and leave-one-out tests and the Synthetic Difference-in-Differences method.