Non-compliance with tax obligations, particularly by wealthy taxpayers and large corporations, continues to represent a source of social injustice that fuels social instability, especially in developing countries. Understanding the strategies of tax evasion and avoidance is of critical importance. This article highlights five main strategies used by large corporations and wealthy taxpayers to avoid taxes, including tax havens, the underground economy, aggressive tax optimization, alternative financial markets, and crypto currencies. We also propose several actions to tackle global tax non-compliance, including prevention, peer reporting, active monitoring of compliance indicators and inter- national cooperation. These actions can be combined to achieve optimal results in reducing tax evasion and avoidance.

The vigorous development of the digital economy has brought new opportunities and challenges to the construction of local fiscal revenue efficiency. Based on the panel data from 2011 to 2020, this paper uses the fixed effect model, instrumental variable method and other empirical studies to investigate the impact of the development of the digital economy on the efficiency of local fiscal revenue. The research results show that the development of the digital economy has directly improved the efficiency of local fiscal revenue, and the regression results of instrumental variables are still significant. The mechanism analysis shows that the development of digital economy mainly promotes local fiscal revenue such as efficiency improvement by cultivating tax sources.

Information leakage in the stock market has been widely proven. Information disclosure is sometimes uneven, and there is significant information asymmetry between ordinary investors and professional institutional investors. In this paper, Regression Discontinuity design (RDD) model is first employed to analyze the information leakage issues. Based on the daily closing stock prices of 15 capital service listed companies, we analyze the difference between the market reaction time and the disclosure time of two stamp tax policies. We found that the sample policies information may leaked to the market about two days earlier. This paper provides a new method analyzing information leakage.