This paper investigates the impacts of COVID-19 on women’s employment and gender disparity with a longitudinal dataset spanning the pandemic. We exploit the regional intensities of social vulnerability and temporal variation to implement the difference-in-differences (DID) estimation. The results indicate that the pandemic and its associated lockdowns generate a significant and negative impact on women’s employment but not on men’s employment. Moreover, a counterfactual analysis using pre-pandemic data further supports the causal nature of the documented relationships. The evidence suggests that economic downturns caused by public health emergencies, unlike previous economic recessions, have a greater impact on women, and differentiated policies should be designed.

The workforce participation rate, and hence the level of employment, for women in Pakistan is among the lowest in South Asia – standing at 25 percent in 2023. Conventional explanations attribute this to poor skills and cultural norms of families and society at large. Empirical work has established that low levels of education, and community attitudes regarding gender roles, hinder women's labor force participation. Ethnographic work suggests that household rules – family culture – on who makes decisions about opportunities for married women to work outside of the home for pay – profoundly impact female employment. This is due to the limited availability of data pertaining to explicit assessments of familial traditions that are pertinent to women's participation in the workforce beyond their domestic sphere. Drawing on data from the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM): 2005-2006 – which provides information, from married women, on who in the family decides if they can work – we address this shortcoming in the literature. We find that in families where the decision lies clearly, and exclusively, in the hands of males, married women are 18-19 percent less likely to be employed than if the family culture is for married women – alone – to make this decision. Moreover, this is a much larger deterrent to work than poor education and residential location.

Self-employment is often associated with entrepreneurship and regarded as a driver of innovation, job creation and economic growth. As such, many countries have policies to promote and support self-employment. One mechanism for self-employment to drive job growth is for sole traders to become an employer through hiring employees. However, there are few studies that investigate if solo self-employment helps the transitions into employership. Using the Understanding Society data, this study shows that in the UK labour market solo self-employment does not work as a ‘steppingstone’ to employership. This raises the question why self-employment should be promoted through public policy as in the UK and many other developed countries.

The Oswald hypothesis is that home ownership reduces mobility and through that channel results in poorer labor market outcomes. There has been only limited previous evidence on the Australian case. Here we use data from the first four Australian censuses of the twenty-first century, aggregated at the smallest geographical areas for which statistics are released. We propose testing the Oswald hypothesis by estimating the effect of home ownership on the full-time employment rate. Modelling the unemployment rate, as is often done in testing the hypothesis, produces implausible results with respect to the control variables, most likely due to the limitations of the official definition of unemployment. We find that, in modelling the full-time employment rate, the control variables for educational and demographic factors have the theoretically plausible effects, while variables capturing rates for both outright home ownership and with mortgage home ownership are positively related to full-time employment rates, with the effect of the former stronger than the latter. Our findings strongly contradict the Oswald hypothesis.

By an endogenous growth model with a two-period overlapping generations structure, I examine the existence of a budget deficit in an economy that endogenously grows by investments of firms. The consumers leave bequests to their descendants and hold money as a part of their savings. I use a Barro-type utility function, where people include the utility of their children in their own utility. The main results are as follows. 1) A budget deficit is necessary for full employment under constant prices. 2) Inflation is induced if the actual budget deficit is greater than the value at which full employment is achieved under constant prices. 3) If the actual budget deficit is smaller than the value which is necessary and sufficient for full employment under constant prices, a recession occurs. Therefore, a balanced budget cannot achieve full employment under constant prices. I do not assume that the budget deficit must later be made up by a budget surplus. I use a Barro-type utility function to prove the necessity (or inevitability) of a budget deficit instead of the neutrality of government debt. In the appendix of this paper, I show that if money, as well as goods, are produced by capital and labor, a budget deficit is not necessary for full employment under constant prices.

I will show that if the propensity to consume from savings satisfies appropriate conditions, the debt-GDP ratio will not grow infinitely large and fiscal collapse will not occur. Using a basic macroeconomic model, with an overlapping generations model in mind, we show the following results: 1) The budget deficit including interest payments on the government bonds equals an increase in the savings from a period to the next period. 2) If the savings in the first period is positive, we need budget deficit to maintain full employment under constant prices or inflation in the later periods. 3) Under an appropriate assumption about the propensity to consume from savings, the debt-GDP ratio converges to a finite value. It does not diverge to infinity. The larger the propensity to consume from savings, the smaller the budget deficit required to achieve full employment. The larger the propensity to consume from savings, the less likely it is that the debt-GDP ratio will become large.