Open Access Journal Article

Are CEOs Paid for Performance? A Study of CEO’s Compensation in the Public Sector Corporations

by Krishna Reddy a,* orcid
a
Faculty of Business, Design and Services Industries, Toi Ohomai Institute of Technology, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
JEA  2023 2(1):15; https://doi.org/10.58567/jea02010002
Received: 25 December 2022 / Accepted: 24 February 2023 / Published Online: 26 February 2023
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Abstract

This study provides insight into CEO compensation dynamics in the public sector and private sector publicly listed firms in New Zealand. This research uses descriptive statistics, OLS regression, and the difference-in-difference method to analyze the compensation-performance relationship for the period 2005 to 2012. Our findings show that CEOs in the private sector publicly listed firms are receiving higher remuneration benefits. Our results suggest that firm sales and past compensation are the most important determinants of CEO cash-based as well as total compensation. Firms with a larger board size and the presence of a formal remuneration committee are likely to provide higher cash compensation than those without.

Keywords: Firm performance; Public sector corporations; Publicly listed companies; CEO cash compensation; CEO total compensation;
Copyright: © 2023 by Reddy. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) (Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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ACS Style
Reddy, K. Are CEOs Paid for Performance? A Study of CEO’s Compensation in the Public Sector Corporations. Journal of Economic Analysis, 2023, 2, 15. https://doi.org/10.58567/jea02010002
AMA Style
Reddy K. Are CEOs Paid for Performance? A Study of CEO’s Compensation in the Public Sector Corporations. Journal of Economic Analysis; 2023, 2(1):15. https://doi.org/10.58567/jea02010002
Chicago/Turabian Style
Reddy, Krishna 2023. "Are CEOs Paid for Performance? A Study of CEO’s Compensation in the Public Sector Corporations" Journal of Economic Analysis 2, no.1:15. https://doi.org/10.58567/jea02010002
APA style
Reddy, K. (2023). Are CEOs Paid for Performance? A Study of CEO’s Compensation in the Public Sector Corporations. Journal of Economic Analysis, 2(1), 15. https://doi.org/10.58567/jea02010002

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