This paper presents a model of bank runs and evaluates relevant policy tools. The model is founded on the historical pattern of banking panics, involving an economic boom, an adverse shock, prominent bank failures, and runs on both insolvent and solvent banks. The model analyzes various ways in which solvency information affects the likelihood of systemwide bank runs. An interesting result is that partial bank-specific information can be worse than no bank-specific information. The model can also explain runs driven by liquidity concern based on incomplete solvency information. The main policy implication derived from the model and the evaluation of policy tools is that policy actions to contain a financial crisis should incorporate weeding out insolvent institutions and assuring the solvency of remaining institutions.
Park, S. (2025). Incomplete Solvency Information as a Trigger for Systemwide Bank Runs. Journal of Economic Analysis, 4(2), 102. doi:10.58567/jea04020005
ACS Style
Park, S. Incomplete Solvency Information as a Trigger for Systemwide Bank Runs. Journal of Economic Analysis, 2025, 4, 102. doi:10.58567/jea04020005
AMA Style
Park S. Incomplete Solvency Information as a Trigger for Systemwide Bank Runs. Journal of Economic Analysis; 2025, 4(2):102. doi:10.58567/jea04020005
Chicago/Turabian Style
Park, Sangkyun 2025. "Incomplete Solvency Information as a Trigger for Systemwide Bank Runs" Journal of Economic Analysis 4, no.2:102. doi:10.58567/jea04020005
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ACS Style
Park, S. Incomplete Solvency Information as a Trigger for Systemwide Bank Runs. Journal of Economic Analysis, 2025, 4, 102. doi:10.58567/jea04020005
AMA Style
Park S. Incomplete Solvency Information as a Trigger for Systemwide Bank Runs. Journal of Economic Analysis; 2025, 4(2):102. doi:10.58567/jea04020005
Chicago/Turabian Style
Park, Sangkyun 2025. "Incomplete Solvency Information as a Trigger for Systemwide Bank Runs" Journal of Economic Analysis 4, no.2:102. doi:10.58567/jea04020005
APA style
Park, S. (2025). Incomplete Solvency Information as a Trigger for Systemwide Bank Runs. Journal of Economic Analysis, 4(2), 102. doi:10.58567/jea04020005
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References
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