We offer an extensive analysis of the significance of information within the realm of Gaussian quadratic economies. We build upon the seminal papers of Morris and Shin (2002, 2007) and consider a signal game of incomplete information. Particularly, we question the suitability of partial transparency portrayed by fragmented information in addition to the private signal in terms of welfare effects. We can summarize our findings in two main points. First, fragmented information, in conjunction with a private signal, can reduce the reliance on public signals. Second, a conflicting effect arises between increasing full disclosure and increasing the precision of fragmented (semi-public) information when examining different complex scenarios, involving for example endogenous private information or imperfect correlated signals. For a critical threshold, an optimal communication strategy designed by fragmented information should be implemented whenever that kind of information is acquired at a high precision.

The Hospital Price Transparency Final Rule aims at reducing the cost of healthcare in the United States by making information about the prices of medical services more readily available to market participants. The economic rationale is that higher price transparency should reduce the level and the dispersion of prices by disincentivizing hospitals from charging higher prices than possible. Using data on 3789 prices for three diagnostic imaging procedures and on the compliance with the rule for 86 acute care hospitals in the Greater Los Angeles area, we test the hypothesis that price levels and price dispersion are lower among hospitals that are more compliant. We do not reject this hypothesis, although we do not observe strictly decreasing relationships in all analyses. Prices are lower at hospitals with high or medium compliance than at hospitals with low compliance, but there is not a clear difference between hospitals with high and hospitals with medium compliance. Prices are less dispersed among hospitals with high compliance than among hospitals with low compliance, but the evidence for hospitals with medium compliance is less clear. We conclude that high compliance with the Hospital Price Transparency Final Rule implies lower prices and less price dispersion among hospitals.