This paper presents an operational framework for assessing the trajectories of production, energy, emissions, and capital accumulation to ensure the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The framework combines widely used methodologies (STIRPAT, system dynamics, and optimization) to simulate the pathways of variables until a target year. The CO-STIRPAT dynamic system allows us to identify the spillover pathways from carbon policy to economic growth based on output optimization principles; to conduct a more systematic analysis of the interconnections between the main drivers that determine carbon emissions; to develop a cost-effective climate policy mix that is a backbone for the right combination of carbon pricing, energy efficiency, and carbon intensity; and to assess NDC targets with respect to ambition gaps, implementation gaps, and feasibility.

This paper presents an analytical framework to assess the probability of achieving nationally determined contributions (NDC). The prediction model based on the Kaya identity is used to simulate the pathway of carbon emission until the target year. Applying the modified STIRPAT framework (named CO-STIRPAT) to data observed in South Korea shows that the probability that the predicted pathway with existing climate technology will stay above the NDC target pathway is significantly high. The result suggests that it is necessary to design a climate policy to improve energy intensity and carbon intensity by accelerating the advance in climate technology.

The high price of energy due to green energy policy will cause adjustments across the US economy predicted in the present general equilibrium model that includes energy Btu input with capital and labor to produce manufactures and services. This same model in trade theory examines the effects of a tariff on an imported factor of production such as a natural resource or capital.  Corresponding error correction estimates of the reduced form equations of the model in annual 1970-2018 data prove robust and suggest model modifications. A parametric approach to noncompetitive pricing based on unit cost diminishing with output brings the model much closer to the estimates. Manufactures are revealed to have a higher degree of noncompetitive pricing than services. Assuming constant elasticity of substitution production, a weak degree is revealed to provide the best fit to the error correction estimates. The high price of green energy will cause an inelastic decrease in energy input resulting in increased energy revenue. Outputs of both sectors fall, more in manufactures due to its energy intensity. The capital return and wage also fall given the weak substitution of capital and labor relative to the price of energy. The wage rises slightly in the model but falls considerably in the error correction estimate. The only clear winner is energy input with increased revenue. The government owns a large share of hydrocarbon reserves and will benefit from a higher price of energy.

This research paper examines changes in patient care management in acute care hospitals between 2001 and 2011. During this time, there were two opposing factors at play: the competition effect of the reform and the policymaker’s decision to reduce public hospitals across France. By studying the trends, it is evident that there has been a significant overall shift in patient care management during this period. This change could be attributed to the global competition effect and the concentration of in-patients in specific public facilities. Through the difference-in-difference method, the study analyzed time variations in the intensity of local competition. It was found that local competition had a negligible impact on patient care management. Additionally, the study revealed that there was a significant positive competition effect on high-technical procedures for the private sector, which is in line with the market segment where private sector hospitals have a leadership position and the pro-competitive reform intensified this position. The study also uncovered a negative competition effect on the length of stay for public hospitals. Prior to the implementation of the DRG-based payment reform, public sector hospitals were paid a global budget. However, after the reform was implemented, they had to shorten the length of stay to increase the number of stays. For-profit hospitals have always been paid based on the number of stays. The results are robust and consistent when alternative measures of local competition are used.