Stock indexes are used as a barometer of economic health, and fluctuations in these markets can have a substantial influence on the economy. For example, the Covid-19 pandemic caused severe economic disruption, as reflected in stock market indexes. Similarly, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has geopolitical implications that might undermine global trade and economic stability, impacting stock market indexes. Considering these developments, the purpose of this article is to examine the co-movements of the stock markets of Austria (ATX), Poland (WIG), the Czech Republic (PX Prague), Hungary (BUX), Croatia (CROBEX), Serbia (BELEX 15), Romania (BET), and Slovenia (SBI TOP) from February 16, 2018, to February 15, 2023. To achieve the research objectives, the aim is to answer the following research question: i) Have the events of 2020 and 2022 accentuated the co-movements between the stock markets in Central Europe? The results show the presence of 21 shocks between markets (out of a potential 56) during the Tranquil subperiod, with the WIG stock index having a greater predictive influence on the behavior of its peers (4 shocks out of 7 possible). During the Stress subperiod, 45 shocks were confirmed (out of 56 possible). The markets that triggered the most market shocks (7 out of 7 possibilities) were BET, BUX, CROBEX, and SBI TOP. The research question was validated based on the conclusion supplied, as all markets increased their movements, showing a considerable effect of the 2020 and 2022 events on these markets.

Banks are at the core of economic functioning in various countries and are the cause of their development in various fields. In a changing environment, they must deal with certain risks and maintain financial stability as the ultimate objective. The primary objective of this study is to examine the correlation between credit risk and bank stability within the Tunisian banking sector, with a specific focus on understanding the moderating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. To achieve this, we employ several econometric techniques, including panel unit root and cointegration tests, panel Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS), and Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS). Our empirical analysis relies on a panel dataset that encompasses a comprehensive sample of 8 Tunisian banks over 2000-2020. The results of our analysis unveil a significant negative relationship between credit risk and bank stability, indicating that higher levels of credit risk exert a detrimental effect on the overall stability of Tunisian banks. Furthermore, our study highlights that this adverse impact is further exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic, suggesting that the pandemic acts as a moderator. The findings of this study hold substantial implications for policymakers, regulators, and bank managers in Tunisia. They emphasize the critical importance of implementing robust risk management practices to mitigate credit risk and bolster bank stability. Additionally, the research underscores the need to consider the unique challenges introduced by external shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, when assessing the overall stability of the banking system.

Many of Keynes´s ideas and concepts are proven correct in this paper. The demand side, mainly business investments, drives the economy. Business firms steer the business cycle via profit expectations and animal spirits. Injections to and withdrawals from the circular flow of income are multiplied throughout the economy in accordance with Keynes´s multiplier. A sudden and sharp rise in households´ saving rates has a detrimental effect on aggregate demand, in line with Keynes´s paradox of thrift. Finance, not saving in the S=I sense, is the necessary condition for business investments and economic growth to be realized. Keynes´s finance motive thus makes money endogenous, contradicting the textbook result that exogenous money steers aggregate demand, contradicting the mainstream loanable funds theory and putting into question the Keynesian theory of sticky prices as a condition for real growth. However, a crucial omission in Keynes´s productive writings is the lack of an accelerator tying income to investment. Some of his followers such as Paul Samuelson tried to remedy that by developing multiplier-accelerator models. The problem with them is that the accelerator lacks micro foundations, in specific disregarding business confidence. Linking macro accounting identities with empirical national accounts data for five major economies produces the finding that business firms explain more than all aggregate expenditure growth during a 25-year period. Thus, it is concluded that business confidence is the root of the business cycle. Making the accelerator account for business confidence casts new light on the perhaps most well-known Keynesian “truth”: active fiscal policy as a main force stabilizing the business cycle. With business confidence being the endogenous and ubiquitous variable driving the business cycle, it turns out that any exogenous factor has the possibility to affect it. Policy needs to be viewed as a competing factor to the factor(s) driving the cycle in the other, destabilizing direction. The more powerful those factors are (e.g., a deadly virus), the tougher it gets for policy to “win” the competition, turning business confidence around. This leads up to the paper´s main conclusion: the worse the economy, the stronger is the case for active fiscal policy, but the lesser is the chance for it to succeed.