Credit markets around the world are undergoing digital transformation which has led to the rise in FinTech and BigTech lending. FinTech and BigTech lending is the provision of credit by FinTech and BigTech providers who have more capital, cutting-edge IT systems, worldwide recognition, greater online presence and are able to handle more big data on computers and mobile phones than traditional banks. FinTech and BigTech lending is growing in importance, but the determinants of FinTech and BigTech lending have received little attention in the literature. This study investigates the determinants of FinTech and BigTech lending. The study focused on the effect of financial inclusion and financial development on FinTech and BigTech lending. Using data for 18 countries from 2013 to 2019 and employing the difference-GMM and 2SLS regression methods, the findings reveal that financial inclusion and financial development are significant determinants of FinTech and BigTech lending. Financial development is a positive determinant of FinTech and BigTech lending while financial inclusion has a significant effect on FinTech and BigTech lending. Also, FinTech and BigTech lending lead to greater banking sector stability and also poses the risk of rising nonperforming loans. There is also a significant positive correlation between financial development and FinTech and BigTech lending. These findings add to the emerging literature on the role of FinTech and BigTech in financial intermediation. This research is significant because it provides insights into the role of financial inclusion and financial development in the digital transformation of credit markets.

Bank capital requirements would entail large social costs if they made resource allocation suboptimal and banking services costly by unduly limiting the banks’ ability to lend. This paper considers three main factors that may make capital requirements relevant, namely, deposit insurance subsidies, stock valuation errors, and tax shields derived from debt financing. The theoretical model analyzes the combined effects of the three factors on the banks’ incentives to make fairly priced loans, which should also be socially optimal loans. A key finding is that the long-term cost of capital requirements is likely to be very small when deposit insurance is underpriced. Increased funding costs resulting from higher capital requirements are absorbed by shareholders of banks, rather than passed on to borrowers. Under some reasonable assumptions, higher capital requirements improve resource allocation by countervailing distortionary effects of deposit insurance subsidies. Short-term adjustment costs can still be large, but it should be relatively easy to mitigate the short-term effects.