Less-Lethal Weapons, including electric Tasers, velocity-reduction bullet-capture projectiles, rubber bullets, beanbag rounds, and other less-lethal projectiles used in police departments, federal and local law enforcement agencies, and military policing operations, as well as for private use, are topics of significant debate in recent years. These weapons can reduce collateral damage, reputational risk, and legal exposure while preventing wrongful and unnecessary deaths caused by conventional bullet wounds. Yet, opponents have highlighted concerns regarding the safety and effectiveness of these weapons, as well as their potential to cause injury or even death. While the primary duty of law enforcement officials is to preserve order and execute the law while protecting individual rights, they ultimately achieve these goals by exercising their coercive authority. Society expects police officers to rely on their professional training and judgment when using physical force to defend citizens and themselves or to apprehend criminal suspects. Because police officers must occasionally participate in physical acts of coercion, it is unavoidable that some of these interactions may result in bodily injuries to individuals, including the officers themselves. These injuries have real costs, such as medical treatment, lost wages, municipal liability, court claims and settlements, riots, and legal or even criminal exposure, as well as less-tangible collateral costs, such as the erosion of police legitimacy and public trust, which are more difficult to quantify but arguably more influential in shaping long-term public perceptions than personal injuries alone. Less lethal technology eliminates some of the concerns raised by lethal weaponry. This study reviews the advantages and disadvantages of these less-lethal weapon technologies versus traditional firearms for use by the police force, federal agencies, and military police while also performing advanced analytics to model the valuation and return on investment for a law enforcement organization implementing such technologies.

The purpose of this paper is to examine and elucidate the effect of the announcement of winning a US federal contract by pharmaceutical companies, traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange on the share prices. The analysis is based on a sample of 327 event days from 12 pharmaceutical companies listed on the NASDAQ market for a given period (2010 – 2021). The sample is analysed by using the event study methodology and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in order to examine the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns during an event window of 10 days before the event and 10 days after the event. While prior researchers have identified significant positive abnormal returns following different types of contract announcements, this study aims to contribute to the existing literature by exploring the specific impact of the public contract in the pharmaceutical market on market shares. By investigating this unique aspect, the research fills a gap in previous studies and enhances our understanding of the relationship between public contract announcements and market performance. The data collection utilises secondary data from the official open data source of US federal spending information and daily stock prices. The collected data is analysed quantitatively using event study methodology, allowing for statistical examination of abnormal returns, such as ANOVA analysis, t-statistic, beta index, time series analysis and linear regression. The research findings indicate a significant impact of public contract-winning announcements on cumulative abnormal returns, suggesting a positive reaction from the market. However, average abnormal returns within the event window were positive but not statistically significant. These results imply that winning a government contract has a limited impact on the stock market. The implications of this research highlight the importance of public contract announcements in the pharmaceutical industry and their influence on share prices. The findings provide valuable insights for investors and stakeholders, aiding decision-making processes related to investment opportunities and market performance.

Many of Keynes´s ideas and concepts are proven correct in this paper. The demand side, mainly business investments, drives the economy. Business firms steer the business cycle via profit expectations and animal spirits. Injections to and withdrawals from the circular flow of income are multiplied throughout the economy in accordance with Keynes´s multiplier. A sudden and sharp rise in households´ saving rates has a detrimental effect on aggregate demand, in line with Keynes´s paradox of thrift. Finance, not saving in the S=I sense, is the necessary condition for business investments and economic growth to be realized. Keynes´s finance motive thus makes money endogenous, contradicting the textbook result that exogenous money steers aggregate demand, contradicting the mainstream loanable funds theory and putting into question the Keynesian theory of sticky prices as a condition for real growth. However, a crucial omission in Keynes´s productive writings is the lack of an accelerator tying income to investment. Some of his followers such as Paul Samuelson tried to remedy that by developing multiplier-accelerator models. The problem with them is that the accelerator lacks micro foundations, in specific disregarding business confidence. Linking macro accounting identities with empirical national accounts data for five major economies produces the finding that business firms explain more than all aggregate expenditure growth during a 25-year period. Thus, it is concluded that business confidence is the root of the business cycle. Making the accelerator account for business confidence casts new light on the perhaps most well-known Keynesian “truth”: active fiscal policy as a main force stabilizing the business cycle. With business confidence being the endogenous and ubiquitous variable driving the business cycle, it turns out that any exogenous factor has the possibility to affect it. Policy needs to be viewed as a competing factor to the factor(s) driving the cycle in the other, destabilizing direction. The more powerful those factors are (e.g., a deadly virus), the tougher it gets for policy to “win” the competition, turning business confidence around. This leads up to the paper´s main conclusion: the worse the economy, the stronger is the case for active fiscal policy, but the lesser is the chance for it to succeed.