Previous literature shows that the price-discovery ability of options market varies substantially over time. Using data of Shanghai Stock Exchange 50 exchange-traded fund options, this paper shows that options prices contribute relatively less to price discovery during low-sentiment periods, but the price-discovery ability of options market remains unchanged during high-sentiment periods. These results suggest that change in aggregate investor sentiment is an important source of the time variation in options’ price discovery ability. Moreover, the options market experiences greater bid-ask spreads when investor sentiment is lower, supporting a “transaction costs mechanism.” This paper fulfills related literature on the time variation in options’ price-discovery ability.

In this study, the time-varying pattern of returns with the trading cost is assessed in light of sanctions on the Russia’s economy. The analysis is performed on the Moscow Exchange Index (MOEX) using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, Bayes’ Theorem technique, and vector error correction model (VECM). Firstly, the transparency of asset’s value in the same trading period was noted to execute the trade with a limited price impact. Thus, the liquidity seems not priced in returns. In addition, the posterior probability of the transparent asset’s value stabilized the market at a limited transaction cost. In this case, there is less likelihood of liquidity acting as a risk element in returns during the same trading session. These results correspond to the era without sanctions, as well as economic restrictions period. Before the economic restrictions, the execution of investment occurred on its real or close value due to the market transparency in the following trading period. This implies, that the past trading cost series is not priced in yields on investment. During the Russia-related sanctions, a higher price impact of transaction was noted due to the ambiguity in the future asset’s value. Therefore, the past liquidity series is a pricing element in the short run and long run. The analysis suggests a potential inference of trading cost to determine the yield on investment.

Deposit insurance systems are designed to balance the benefits of preventing bank runs and protecting ordinary savers against the costs of reduced market discipline and potential burdens on taxpayers. Design flaws of deposit insurance make the benefits too low and the costs too high. This paper presents an example in which solvent banks can effectively manage runs, depositors discipline banks to a reasonable extent, and taxpayers have a fair deal. It has three key features: the bank’s authority to activate deposit insurance early, a coinsurance scheme that transfer money from those who run on solvent banks to those who stay put, and a shareholder position for taxpayers. Early activation of deposit insurance prevents fire sales of assets and provides opportunities to verify the bank’s solvency. The coinsurance scheme weakens the incentive to run and strengthens the incentive to hold on to their accounts. As shareholders, taxpayers receive dividends in normal times in exchange for large payouts in catastrophic events.