By an endogenous growth model with a two-period overlapping generations structure, I examine the existence of a budget deficit in an economy that endogenously grows by investments of firms. The consumers leave bequests to their descendants and hold money as a part of their savings. I use a Barro-type utility function, where people include the utility of their children in their own utility. The main results are as follows. 1) A budget deficit is necessary for full employment under constant prices. 2) Inflation is induced if the actual budget deficit is greater than the value at which full employment is achieved under constant prices. 3) If the actual budget deficit is smaller than the value which is necessary and sufficient for full employment under constant prices, a recession occurs. Therefore, a balanced budget cannot achieve full employment under constant prices. I do not assume that the budget deficit must later be made up by a budget surplus. I use a Barro-type utility function to prove the necessity (or inevitability) of a budget deficit instead of the neutrality of government debt. In the appendix of this paper, I show that if money, as well as goods, are produced by capital and labor, a budget deficit is not necessary for full employment under constant prices.

I examine the problem of budget deficit in a growing economy in which consumers hold money as a part of their savings in the case where consumers live forever. For simplicity and tractability I use a discrete time dynamic model and Lagrange multiplier method. In the appendix I briefly explain the solution using a discrete time version of the Hamiltonian method. I will show the following results. 1) Budget deficit is necessary for full employment under constant prices. 2) Inflation is induced if the actual budget deficit is greater than the value at which full employment is achieved under constant prices. 3) If the actual budget deficit is smaller than the value which is necessary and sufficient for full employment under constant prices, a recession occurs. Therefore, balanced budget cannot achieve full employment under constant prices. I do not assume that budget deficit must later be made up by budget surplus.

In this paper I will show that budget deficit (or fiscal deficit) is necessary to achieve full employment under constant prices or inflation, using a model of endogenous growth in which consumers hold money for the reason of liquidity and live forever. Budget deficit need not be offset by future budget surpluses. I consider the continuous time case by taking the limit of the discrete time case when the time interval approaches zero. A continuous time dynamic model seems to be more general than a discrete time model. When the actual budget deficit is greater (smaller) than the value which is necessary and sufficient for full employment under constant prices, an inflation (a recession) occurs. The main argument of this paper is that a growing economy requires the continuation of budget deficit, and that we should not think of paying off the resulting government debt with taxes.

I will show that if the propensity to consume from savings satisfies appropriate conditions, the debt-GDP ratio will not grow infinitely large and fiscal collapse will not occur. Using a basic macroeconomic model, with an overlapping generations model in mind, we show the following results: 1) The budget deficit including interest payments on the government bonds equals an increase in the savings from a period to the next period. 2) If the savings in the first period is positive, we need budget deficit to maintain full employment under constant prices or inflation in the later periods. 3) Under an appropriate assumption about the propensity to consume from savings, the debt-GDP ratio converges to a finite value. It does not diverge to infinity. The larger the propensity to consume from savings, the smaller the budget deficit required to achieve full employment. The larger the propensity to consume from savings, the less likely it is that the debt-GDP ratio will become large.

In his "The World’s smallest macroeconomic model” (Krugman (1999)), Paul Krugman argued that under the assumption of price rigidity, a shortage of money supply leads to underemployment or recession, so increasing money supply can eliminate underemployment and restore full employment. But, how do we increase the money supply? I will show that we need a government deficit to increase the money supply in order to restore full employment from recession. Also, I will show that in a growing economy, if people hold money, a government deficit is necessary to maintain full employment under constant price or inflation. A government deficit is not only effective in pulling the economy out of recession, it is even necessary for continued growth without inviting either recession or inflation. The government deficit in this paper represents the difference between government expenditures and government revenues. When the difference is positive, we say that the government has a deficit. This paper seeks to explore theoretically and normatively the role of government deficits in achieving and maintaining full employment in a growing economy without causing inflation, using a very simple model by Krugman.

This paper attempts to introduce an overlapping generations structure into Paul Krugman's "The world's smallest macroeconomic model" (Krugman (1999)) to examine the implications of fiscal policy, particularly fiscal deficits, in a framework suitable for policy analysis. In that paper, Krugman argued that under the price rigidity assumption, a shortage in the money supply leads to underemployment and recession, so increasing the money supply would eliminate underemployment and restore full employment. But how can the money supply be increased? I show that in order to restore full employment out of a recession, a fiscal deficit is needed to increase the money supply. I also show that in a growing economy, fiscal deficits are necessary to maintain full employment at constant prices or inflation. Fiscal deficits are not only effective in pulling the economy out of recession, they are even necessary for growth to continue without recession or inflation. The fiscal deficit in this paper represents the difference between government spending and government revenues. If this difference is positive, we say that the government is in deficit. Krugman's original model is a one-period static model. I intend to extend this model to a dynamic overlapping generations model.

A high inflation period of seven years (1978-1985) in Israel, which turned into a hyperinflation, puzzled Israeli economists, who tried to understand its causes and mechanisms. As a result, they provided fourteen different explanations. Although all of the explanations were based on the same data, the researchers’ conclusions were either different or contradictory. This situation provides a virtual laboratory for the study of the ways and methods of economic thought; it is a classical Ceteris patribus situation. This laboratory further raises other subjects and questions. Are there principal differences between the economists' explanations? Is it possible to classify these differences? How do economic explanations for inflation differ from non-economic ones? In this article, I classified thirteen economic studies and one non-economic study into five clusters. This was the methodological tool used to inquire into the economic thought in this virtual laboratory.

This study simultaneously tests Wagner’s law on one hand and Keynes proposition on the other hand related both government spending and output in Ivory Coast that experiencing long run economic growth and widened deficit. That challenges the country’s fiscal sustainability. With annual data from 1980 to 2020, results show that Wagner’s law holds, the elasticity of government spending to output is greater than one. There is bidirectional causality between government size and output validating Keynesian idea that public expenditure is an exogenous factor and a policy instrument for increasing national income. Wagner law and public deficit can justify Ivorian over-indebtedness.

This paper presents an operational framework for assessing the trajectories of production, energy, emissions, and capital accumulation to ensure the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The framework combines widely used methodologies (STIRPAT, system dynamics, and optimization) to simulate the pathways of variables until a target year. The CO-STIRPAT dynamic system allows us to identify the spillover pathways from carbon policy to economic growth based on output optimization principles; to conduct a more systematic analysis of the interconnections between the main drivers that determine carbon emissions; to develop a cost-effective climate policy mix that is a backbone for the right combination of carbon pricing, energy efficiency, and carbon intensity; and to assess NDC targets with respect to ambition gaps, implementation gaps, and feasibility.

This paper presents an analytical framework to assess the probability of achieving nationally determined contributions (NDC). The prediction model based on the Kaya identity is used to simulate the pathway of carbon emission until the target year. Applying the modified STIRPAT framework (named CO-STIRPAT) to data observed in South Korea shows that the probability that the predicted pathway with existing climate technology will stay above the NDC target pathway is significantly high. The result suggests that it is necessary to design a climate policy to improve energy intensity and carbon intensity by accelerating the advance in climate technology.

Deposit insurance systems are designed to balance the benefits of preventing bank runs and protecting ordinary savers against the costs of reduced market discipline and potential burdens on taxpayers. Design flaws of deposit insurance make the benefits too low and the costs too high. This paper presents an example in which solvent banks can effectively manage runs, depositors discipline banks to a reasonable extent, and taxpayers have a fair deal. It has three key features: the bank’s authority to activate deposit insurance early, a coinsurance scheme that transfer money from those who run on solvent banks to those who stay put, and a shareholder position for taxpayers. Early activation of deposit insurance prevents fire sales of assets and provides opportunities to verify the bank’s solvency. The coinsurance scheme weakens the incentive to run and strengthens the incentive to hold on to their accounts. As shareholders, taxpayers receive dividends in normal times in exchange for large payouts in catastrophic events.

Bank capital requirements would entail large social costs if they made resource allocation suboptimal and banking services costly by unduly limiting the banks’ ability to lend. This paper considers three main factors that may make capital requirements relevant, namely, deposit insurance subsidies, stock valuation errors, and tax shields derived from debt financing. The theoretical model analyzes the combined effects of the three factors on the banks’ incentives to make fairly priced loans, which should also be socially optimal loans. A key finding is that the long-term cost of capital requirements is likely to be very small when deposit insurance is underpriced. Increased funding costs resulting from higher capital requirements are absorbed by shareholders of banks, rather than passed on to borrowers. Under some reasonable assumptions, higher capital requirements improve resource allocation by countervailing distortionary effects of deposit insurance subsidies. Short-term adjustment costs can still be large, but it should be relatively easy to mitigate the short-term effects.

Global distributions of net factor income from abroad (NFI) during 1990-2019 have witnessed that (1) the United States is the top one country accounting for 40% of surpluses of the global total, while a surge in China’s deficit with its GDP increase; (2) GDP growth in emerging economies has a price scissors with NFI deficits; (3) asymmetric NFI has covered up the severity of rich countries’ global arbitrages especially from emerging economies; (4) China’s economic power is exaggerated by the PPP-based GDP implemented by the World Bank. It concludes that (1) developing countries have paid for huge hidden cost for their emergence; (2) the statement of the United States suffering losses absolutely does not hold; (3) GDP is not a universal tool for measuring what matters. It suggests that (1) emerging economies countries should beware of the potential misleading of GDP on economic measurement and economic power comparison ; (2) GDP should be critiqued from the applicability perspective of economies’ types; (3) it is urgent to clarify some misjudgment and misleading concepts in the economic affairs surrounding the global value chain patterns; (4) the construction of national governance capacity in emerging economies should focus on “social infrastructure”, of which one of the important parts is an effective economic statistics system; (5) emerging economies should carry out the strategic layout of international economic statistics talents to enhance their soft powers.

This study explores the cause and effect of endogenous risk aversion in land pricing, where state intervention through taxation remains a general practice. Using a consumption-based asset pricing model incorporating taxation, it is shown that high taxation, due to the indexation effect, supporting land prices and reducing individuals' risk expectations, could lead to an endogenous decrease in risk aversion, which could result in market dysfunction because risk aversion plays a key role in the market mechanism. China, with its wholly state-owned land and the general use of land sales to cover financial deficits, is a typical case for empirical tests. The tests confirm that there, the rise in land prices was driven by the increase in reserve prices set by local governments, a strong means of taxation, and not by the market, indicating the endogenous decrease in risk aversion.

Traditionally, conditions of sustainability of the public debt have long been related quite exclusively to fiscal policy and to budgetary parameters. However, the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies regarding the fixation of the interest rate is fundamental. Indeed, a simple analytical modelling shows that if the nominal interest rate increases exponentially with the public debt, because of a default (credit) risk premium, if the confidence of investors is fundamental, conditions of sustainability of the public debt could be much more difficult to comply with. Indeed, if the interest rate is risk-free, values for which the public debt can be sustainable are less constraining if the long-term GDP growth rate is high, or if the long-term risk-free nominal interest rate is small. They are also less constraining if the country decides to turn to a non-negligible primary budget surplus in case of a high public debt. However, if the interest rate exponentially increases with the public debt level, in case of a significant importance of the default (credit) risk premium, these parameters have very limited consequences on sustainable and equilibrium public debt levels. The sustainable public debt that a government should target is then much smaller than in absence of this risk premium.

This research paper examines changes in patient care management in acute care hospitals between 2001 and 2011. During this time, there were two opposing factors at play: the competition effect of the reform and the policymaker’s decision to reduce public hospitals across France. By studying the trends, it is evident that there has been a significant overall shift in patient care management during this period. This change could be attributed to the global competition effect and the concentration of in-patients in specific public facilities. Through the difference-in-difference method, the study analyzed time variations in the intensity of local competition. It was found that local competition had a negligible impact on patient care management. Additionally, the study revealed that there was a significant positive competition effect on high-technical procedures for the private sector, which is in line with the market segment where private sector hospitals have a leadership position and the pro-competitive reform intensified this position. The study also uncovered a negative competition effect on the length of stay for public hospitals. Prior to the implementation of the DRG-based payment reform, public sector hospitals were paid a global budget. However, after the reform was implemented, they had to shorten the length of stay to increase the number of stays. For-profit hospitals have always been paid based on the number of stays. The results are robust and consistent when alternative measures of local competition are used.