Giving full play to the interaction of multi-dimensional environmental regulation is an important method to accelerate the green transformation of manufacturing enterprises which is a significant way to achieve carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals. Based on the theory of evolution game, a green transformation strategy evolution game model participated by the government, consumers, and manufacturing enterprises has been constructed. Stability research is conducted based on the behavioral mode of the three parties participating subjects and the paper uses MATLAB for numerical simulation to analyze the impact of environmental regulations of different dimensions on the green transformation of enterprises. The research shows that: (1) When the government adopts a single environmental regulation of carbon emission right transaction or green consumption subsidy, it will not affect the choice of green transformation strategies of the enterprise. (2) When the government adopts a single environmental regulation of environmental protection tax, it only promotes enterprises to choose green transformation strategies under limited conditions. (3) Under the multi-dimensional environmental regulations of the government, by affecting the cost and income of enterprise green technology innovation, consumers’ green consumption behavior, and the manufacturing enterprises choose green transformation as a stable strategy. Therefore, the government should give full play to the role of multi-dimensional environmental regulations in promoting consumers' green consumption and enterprises’ green technology innovation to accelerate the green transformation of manufacturing enterprises.

This study analyzes how the presence and the composition of nomination committees could influence innovation. Specifically, we focus on the committee size, the frequency of meetings, and the presence of independent and female members. Innovation is measured by (1) the firm’s ability to produce innovations such as new or improved products/processes and the number of patents, and (2) innovation expenditures (R&D spending and the number of scientists and experts per R&D teams). This study is drawn on firms listed on the SBF120 index, between 2002 and 2016. It provides the following results: First, the presence of nomination committees is negatively associated with the number of patent applications and the number of scientists and engineers in R&D teams. Furthermore, most of the nomination committee’s attributes (such as the presence of independent and women members) have no significant association with innovation proxies. We show, also, that large nomination committees are prone to increase innovation income (such as the R&D expenditures and the number of scientists and experts per R&D teams) as well as the number of filed patents. Turning to the committee functioning provides evidence that the frequency of meetings could reduce asymmetric information regarding innovation projects and lead to an increase of R&D expenses. This article brings practical insights to board structures issues. This study contributes to the current debate on how boards should be organized, specifically; the nomination committees. It shows that boards should pay attention to the nomination committee features as they could undermine innovation projects, specifically in innovation-sensitive industries.