Credit markets around the world are undergoing digital transformation which has led to the rise in FinTech and BigTech lending. FinTech and BigTech lending is the provision of credit by FinTech and BigTech providers who have more capital, cutting-edge IT systems, worldwide recognition, greater online presence and are able to handle more big data on computers and mobile phones than traditional banks. FinTech and BigTech lending is growing in importance, but the determinants of FinTech and BigTech lending have received little attention in the literature. This study investigates the determinants of FinTech and BigTech lending. The study focused on the effect of financial inclusion and financial development on FinTech and BigTech lending. Using data for 18 countries from 2013 to 2019 and employing the difference-GMM and 2SLS regression methods, the findings reveal that financial inclusion and financial development are significant determinants of FinTech and BigTech lending. Financial development is a positive determinant of FinTech and BigTech lending while financial inclusion has a significant effect on FinTech and BigTech lending. Also, FinTech and BigTech lending lead to greater banking sector stability and also poses the risk of rising nonperforming loans. There is also a significant positive correlation between financial development and FinTech and BigTech lending. These findings add to the emerging literature on the role of FinTech and BigTech in financial intermediation. This research is significant because it provides insights into the role of financial inclusion and financial development in the digital transformation of credit markets.

This paper presents a model of bank runs and evaluates relevant policy tools. The model is founded on the historical pattern of banking panics, involving an economic boom, an adverse shock, prominent bank failures, and runs on both insolvent and solvent banks. The model analyzes various ways in which solvency information affects the likelihood of systemwide bank runs. An interesting result is that partial bank-specific information can be worse than no bank-specific information. The model can also explain runs driven by liquidity concern based on incomplete solvency information. The main policy implication derived from the model and the evaluation of policy tools is that policy actions to contain a financial crisis should incorporate weeding out insolvent institutions and assuring the solvency of remaining institutions.

Many of Keynes´s ideas and concepts are proven correct in this paper. The demand side, mainly business investments, drives the economy. Business firms steer the business cycle via profit expectations and animal spirits. Injections to and withdrawals from the circular flow of income are multiplied throughout the economy in accordance with Keynes´s multiplier. A sudden and sharp rise in households´ saving rates has a detrimental effect on aggregate demand, in line with Keynes´s paradox of thrift. Finance, not saving in the S=I sense, is the necessary condition for business investments and economic growth to be realized. Keynes´s finance motive thus makes money endogenous, contradicting the textbook result that exogenous money steers aggregate demand, contradicting the mainstream loanable funds theory and putting into question the Keynesian theory of sticky prices as a condition for real growth. However, a crucial omission in Keynes´s productive writings is the lack of an accelerator tying income to investment. Some of his followers such as Paul Samuelson tried to remedy that by developing multiplier-accelerator models. The problem with them is that the accelerator lacks micro foundations, in specific disregarding business confidence. Linking macro accounting identities with empirical national accounts data for five major economies produces the finding that business firms explain more than all aggregate expenditure growth during a 25-year period. Thus, it is concluded that business confidence is the root of the business cycle. Making the accelerator account for business confidence casts new light on the perhaps most well-known Keynesian “truth”: active fiscal policy as a main force stabilizing the business cycle. With business confidence being the endogenous and ubiquitous variable driving the business cycle, it turns out that any exogenous factor has the possibility to affect it. Policy needs to be viewed as a competing factor to the factor(s) driving the cycle in the other, destabilizing direction. The more powerful those factors are (e.g., a deadly virus), the tougher it gets for policy to “win” the competition, turning business confidence around. This leads up to the paper´s main conclusion: the worse the economy, the stronger is the case for active fiscal policy, but the lesser is the chance for it to succeed.

Bank capital requirements would entail large social costs if they made resource allocation suboptimal and banking services costly by unduly limiting the banks’ ability to lend. This paper considers three main factors that may make capital requirements relevant, namely, deposit insurance subsidies, stock valuation errors, and tax shields derived from debt financing. The theoretical model analyzes the combined effects of the three factors on the banks’ incentives to make fairly priced loans, which should also be socially optimal loans. A key finding is that the long-term cost of capital requirements is likely to be very small when deposit insurance is underpriced. Increased funding costs resulting from higher capital requirements are absorbed by shareholders of banks, rather than passed on to borrowers. Under some reasonable assumptions, higher capital requirements improve resource allocation by countervailing distortionary effects of deposit insurance subsidies. Short-term adjustment costs can still be large, but it should be relatively easy to mitigate the short-term effects.