This paper analyses a model of private value auctions with symmetric risk-neutral bidders, where bidders' private values of an indivisible good are fuzzy. The auction is studied as a game with incomplete information. Fuzzy random variables, their quantile functions, and expressions for expectations through quantile functions are used. An explicit expression for the solution is found. Also, expected bidders' payments are studied.

I will show that if the propensity to consume from savings satisfies appropriate conditions, the debt-GDP ratio will not grow infinitely large and fiscal collapse will not occur. Using a basic macroeconomic model, with an overlapping generations model in mind, we show the following results: 1) The budget deficit including interest payments on the government bonds equals an increase in the savings from a period to the next period. 2) If the savings in the first period is positive, we need budget deficit to maintain full employment under constant prices or inflation in the later periods. 3) Under an appropriate assumption about the propensity to consume from savings, the debt-GDP ratio converges to a finite value. It does not diverge to infinity. The larger the propensity to consume from savings, the smaller the budget deficit required to achieve full employment. The larger the propensity to consume from savings, the less likely it is that the debt-GDP ratio will become large.