Open Access Journal Article

Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game

by Pierre Dehez a,* orcid  and  Eustache Mêgnigbêto b orcid
a
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) LIDAM, UCLouvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
b
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Antwerp, Belgium
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 21 August 2024 / Accepted: 29 September 2024 / Published Online: 7 November 2024

Abstract

We generalize the 3-player game introduced by Mêgnigbêto (2018) to analyze the synergies existing between universities, the industry and the government in the Triple Helix, a model of research and innovation introduced by Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz (1995). We consider situations involving any number of actors and we allow for a differentiation of their contributions. The resulting game has nonnegative Harsanyi dividends, implying its convexity. The relative size of the core measures the extent of the synergies and the Shapley value measures the contribution of each actor to these synergies. Incidentally, the resulting game lends itself to a wide range of applications.


Copyright: © 2024 by Dehez and Mêgnigbêto. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) (Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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ACS Style
Dehez, P.; Mêgnigbêto, E. Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game. Journal of Information Economics, 2024, 2, 29. https://doi.org/10.58567/jie02020003
AMA Style
Dehez P, Mêgnigbêto E. Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game. Journal of Information Economics; 2024, 2(2):29. https://doi.org/10.58567/jie02020003
Chicago/Turabian Style
Dehez, Pierre; Mêgnigbêto, Eustache 2024. "Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game" Journal of Information Economics 2, no.2:29. https://doi.org/10.58567/jie02020003
APA style
Dehez, P., & Mêgnigbêto, E. (2024). Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game. Journal of Information Economics, 2(2), 29. https://doi.org/10.58567/jie02020003

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